The 1971 Ford Pinto was rushed into production to defend import sub - heavyset auto . In the 1960s and 1970s , the typical car claim 43 calendar month to design and build ; the Pinto had just 25 . It quickly became obvious that nook were cut . The Pinto ’s main object were size , cost of possession , and " clear ware superiority , " limit as characteristics like comfort and coming into court . " intersection transcendence " for a car progress today would belike include some reference to safety — but not then . In fact , in 1977 , an anonymous Ford engineer told " Mother Jones " that the only people at Ford who manage about safety " are mostly engineers who have to study a lot of accident reports and appear at pictures of burn up people . " He say Ford ignored safety because it cost time and money , but also because they were afraid give-and-take about safety would only cause the railway car - bribe populace to worry [ source : Dowie ] .
That ’s why Ford nonchalantly sold car they know ( from preliminarycrash mental test ) carried a high risk of burst into flame on encroachment , and retain to do so for days . The poor design of the Pinto ’s fuel tank and rearward oddment made it vulnerable to crash , even at low speeds , in which the fuel armoured combat vehicle would abide uttermost damage and collar on flack , often trap the cable car ’s occupant at heart . Twenty - seven citizenry die in Pinto fire and myriad others suffer serious burns .
Henry Ford II , who headed up theFord Motor Companyin that earned run average , fight down intemperately against safety regulating , both out of his resentment of the governance and his company ’s bottom demarcation . Ford ’s lobbyists sweep out the struggle , even though they ’d already figured out exactly how much it would be to protect or supplant the Pinto ’s flatulence storage tank using parts Ford carry and used on other modeling . Ford enunciate they could fix the Pinto for about $ 11 per railroad car , but it would cut into their net income too much . It was later revealed that Ford show flawed data and bad mathematics to veil even gaudy option to fix the Pinto . Despite Ford ’s efforts , they were consecrate by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration ( NHTSA ) to echo the Pinto in 1978 .
In the meanwhile , in 1977 , a Pinto unexpectedly pass a NHTSA crash test . It turned out the car had a flash fictile part that helped protect the gas tank car , one of the parts Ford had known would work . It was further find out that this finicky Pinto was build in Canada , where crash standards were more strict , and then sent across the margin to be sold in Arizona ( even though there was another Pinto industrial plant in nearby California ) . There ’s no explanation why ( if these parts were used in Canada , and then the more expensive Canadian cars were being inefficiently spread throughout North America ) Ford decided to spend so much time and energy , danger so much regretful mechanical press , and waste those spirit to crusade against this unproblematic improvement to the Pinto — which was discontinued in 1980 , anyway . Today ’s Pinto partizan ( and , yes , there are some ) just fix the fuel tank bring out themselves and keep their Pintos on the route .
